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We propose a novel method to detect and visualize
malware through image classification. The executable
binaries are represented as grayscale images obtained
from the count of N-grams (N=2) of bytes in the Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT) domain and a neural network
is trained for malware detection. A shallow neural
network is trained for classification, and its accuracy
is compared with deep-network architectures such as
ResNet that are trained using transfer learning. Neither
dis-assembly nor behavioral analysis of malware is
required for these methods. Motivated by the visual
similarity of these images for different malware families,
we compare our deep neural network models with
standard image features like GIST descriptors to
evaluate the performance. A joint feature measure
is proposed to combine different features using error
analysis to get an accurate ensemble model for improved
classification performance. A new dataset called
MaleX1 which contains around 1 million malware
and benign Windows executable samples is created
for large-scale malware detection and classification
experiments. Experimental results are quite promising
with 96% binary classification accuracy on MaleX.
The proposed model is also able to generalize well on
larger unseen malware samples and the results compare
favorably with state-of-the-art static analysis-based
malware detection algorithms.
1. Introduction
Malicious applications and software (malware) are
one of the major security threats the internet faces
today. To detect malware with high precision and
less computational power is beneficial as it becomes
1https://github.com/Mayachitra-Inc/MaleX
significantly easier to create strategies to assuage the
extent of harm caused by such malware.
Many researchers use hand-crafted features to
detect malware (discussed in Section 2), but recent
advancements in machine learning suggest that deep
neural networks are superior in learning useful features
and come up with good malware representations. These
features are at best, non-orthogonal and significantly
improve the accuracies of classification, compared
to human hand-crafted features. In this paper, we
approach the above problem of detecting malware with
a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) model. In
this paper, we apply CNNs to the problem of malware
detection.
Previous research has shown that malware variants
belonging to the same family exhibit visual similarity
in the byteplot images [1, 2]. These are based on
visualization in the spatial domain by converting bytes
to pixels. In this paper, we take a different approach
and visualize malware in the frequency domain to
detect malware. The motivation to visualize malware
in frequency domain is because of the “sparse” feature
representations of malware in literature [3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8] that are typically extracted from raw bytes of
the binaries or disassembled instructions (n-grams,
n-perms). One way to visualize such sparse signals
is to compute Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) of
the signal to “de-sparsify” them and get a better
visual representation which will be useful for various
applications like classification and detection. We
present one such method which visualizes frequency
count of bi-grams of raw bytes in frequency domain.
After obtaining these digital image representations of
malware binaries, we employ Convolutional Neural
Networks to detect malware. Finally, we also designed
a joint feature metric (Appendix. A) that justifies





combining both these features to create an accurate
ensemble model for malware detection.
The main contributions in this paper are as follows:
• We propose a novel method to detect malware
by visualizing malware binaries in the frequency
domain (“bigram-dct” images).
• We created a new dataset called MaleX which has
864,669 malware and 179,725 benign Windows
executable samples that can be used for large
data-driven malware detection and classification
experiments.
• Leveraging recent advances in machine learning,
we employ Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs), which are known to achieve superior
accuracy, to detect malware.
• Finally, we combine features from byteplot
images and “bigram-dct” images using the
proposed joint feature metric to get a highly
accurate ensemble neural network model for
malware detection.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we discuss the related work in malware
detection and visualization. In Sections 3 and 4, we
present our method to visualize malware binaries in
frequency domain and detect them using the proposed
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) model. We
discuss the evaluation metrics, experimental methods,
results and discussion in Section 5 and conclude in
Section 6. In Appendix. A, we define an “orthogonality”
metric to better understand the combination of different
features for improved classification performance.
2. Related Work
Typical features extracted from malware can be
broadly grouped into either static or dynamic features.
As the name suggests, static features are extracted from
the malware without executing it. Dynamic features,
on the other hand, are extracted by executing the code,
usually in a virtual environment, and then studying
their behavioral characteristics such as system calls trace
or network behavior. We will review some of the
approaches here.
Static analysis can further be classified into static
code based analysis and non code based analysis. Static
code based analysis techniques study the functioning
of an executable by disassembling the executable and
then extracting features. The most common static
code based analysis method based is control flow graph
analysis [9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. After dis-assembly,
the control flow of the malware is obtained from the
sequence of instructions and graphs are constructed to
uniquely characterize the malware. Static non code
based techniques are based on a variety of techniques:
n-grams [14, 15, 16, 17, 18], n-perms [7, 8, 19], hash
based techniques [20, 21, 22], PE file structure [23, 24,
25, 26] or signal similarity based techniques [1, 27,
28, 29, 30]. Among the first two methods, n-grams
or n-perms are either computed on the raw bytes
of the binaries or on the disassembled instructions.
Features are then extracted from these to characterize
the malware. However, n-gram-based approaches
are less scalable because of the computationally
expensive feature matching operation over relatively
large dimensionality of the n-gram feature space. Jang
et al. [5] proposed feature hashing to reduce the
high-dimensional feature space in malware analysis, and
implemented feature hashing on n-gram based features.
Among hash based methods, ssdeep [31] is
a common technique to compute context triggered
piece-wise hashes on raw binaries. Pehash [32],
however, uses the Portable Executable (PE) file structure
to compute a similarity hash. There are also techniques
that extract discriminative features from the Portable
Executable (PE) structure of an executable [33, 34,
35]. Image similarity based methods [1, 27] convert
a malware binary to a digital image and apply image
processing based techniques to compute similarity
features. Among dynamic analysis, the most common
method is to execute the malware in a controlled
environment and then study its execution behavior.
Behavioral profiles or graphs are generated to build
models of malware [36, 37]. Some works generate a
human readable report of the execution flow and extract
features from the reports [38, 39].
Recently, there has been lot of research involving
malware detection using deep learning [40, 41],
recurrent neural networks (RNNs) [42, 43, 44],
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [45, 46, 47,
48, 49] and hybrid models [50, 51, 52]. The works
that use CNNs, typically converts malware binaries to
digital images and pass them into a CNN in order to
detect malware. However, in this paper, we visualize
malware in the frequency domain and then use CNNs
for malware detection. The proposed malware detection
approach also has all the positives of static analysis
methods while addressing some of the limitations of the
aforementioned works like high time complexity, low
scalability and high total feature selection count.
3. Malware visualization in frequency
domain
A given executable binary file is read as a
16-bit signed hexadecimal vector and divided into
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Figure 1: Visualizing malware as a grayscale image in DCT domain.
corresponding bi-grams (n-grams of bytes with n=2).
As an example, for the byte-stream 0a1bc48a, the
corresponding bi-grams will be 0a1b, 1bc4 and c48a.
We then use the bi-gram frequency count to get a
sparse image of dimensions 256x256 (where each pixel
intensity value corresponds to normalized frequency
count of a particular bi-gram). The image dimensions
is the primary reason for choosing bi-grams (n=2) as it
aids image-based machine learning classification with
low time complexity in the training phase. Finally,
we compute the full frame Discrete Cosine Transform
(DCT) of this image to de-sparsify and get a resulting
“bigram-dct” image with distinctive textured patterns.
Before normalizing frequency count to get the sparse
image, we zero out the first frequency count value
corresponding to the bi-gram 0000, as this value is
relatively very large compared to that of other bi-grams
and the bi-gram either corresponds to empty space or
new line(s) in the code with no useful information. The
overview of the proposed feature extraction method is
shown in Figure 1.
Even-though, in this work, we restrict our discussion
to malware detection rather than malware classification,
we see (Figure 2) that these textured patterns are distinct
for various malware families and can also be used
to classify malware binaries into different malware
families.
4. Malware Detection using CNN
Deep learning recently gained remarkable success
in solving computer vision problems, especially the
task of image classification. For our “bigram-dct”
images, one can extract global image features like
GIST [54], which have been shown to be successful
in scene classification and object classification [55]
and feed them into standard classifiers such as k-NN
(k-Nearest Neighbors) or Random Forests to detect
malware binaries through classification. These features
are computed by convolution of the filter with an image
at different scales and orientations. Thus, high and
Figure 2: The images in the first row are “bigram-dct”
images of three instances of malware belonging to the
family Lolyda.AT and those in the second row belong
to the family Adialer.C (malware samples from the
MalImg [53] dataset).
low frequency repetitive gradient directions of an image
can be measured using GIST features. But, to perform
classification in an end-to-end manner and to be more
discriminative, one can utilize Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNNs) to automatically extract relevant
features, similar to what Razavian et al. did in [56].
4.1. Network Architectures
We use a shallow network to have more control
over the design and parameters of the neural network.
We also used pre-trained ImageNet [57] deep network
models (ResNet-18/ResNet-50) [58] and fine-tuned
them to observe the effect of depth of networks on
the feature learning paradigm. Both the network
architectures are briefly described below.
4.1.1. Proposed “3C2D” model Eventhough,
Simonyan et al. [59] showed that classification
accuracies can be improved by going deep in the




Figure 3: Pipeline for the end-to-end deep
learning-based malware detection.
LeNet-5 model [60] to have control over the model in
terms of number of parameters and time complexity.
Our proposed CNN architecture consists of:
1. Input layer of 256x256 pixels
2. Convolutional layer (32 filter maps of size 3x3)
3. Max-pooling layer (size 2x2)
4. Convolutional layer (64 filter maps of size 3x3)
5. Max-pooling layer (size 2x2)
6. Convolutional layer (128 filter maps of size 3x3)
7. Max-pooling layer (size 2x2)
8. Densely-connected layer with Dropout (512
neurons)
9. Densely-connected layer with Dropout (256
neurons)
10. Output “sigmoid” layer
A potential threat for any deep neural network model
is overfitting. Srivastava et al. [61] invented ‘dropout’
where the units in the layers are randomly dropped to
prevent overfitting. We used two such dropout layers
(with probability = 0.5) after the two fully-connected
layers to prevent overfitting. In testing phase, these
dropout layers will be removed.
This model is used for both the binary classification
(end-to-end pipeline outlined in Figure 3a) and the
performance comparison (with the standard classifiers)
experiments, as will be discussed in the following
section.
4.1.2. ResNet model Almost all the transfer
learning-based approaches in the domain of malware
detection and classification [62, 63, 64, 65, 66] use
deep network architectures that are known to perform
well for image classification task. We employed similar
principles and used well-known ResNet variants
ResNet-18 and ResNet-50 for the purpose of malware
classification.
As the model expects a 3-channel input, we use
sparse and dct-based representations of bigram images
in addition to the well-known byteplot [53] image
representation of malware binaries (end-to-end pipeline
outlined in Figure 3b). More details are discussed in the
following section.
This model is used for comparing classification
performance to that of the proposed shallow CNN model
and standard classifiers.
5. Experiments and Results
We conducted our experiments on two different
datasets: (1) smalldata to parameterize the deep network
model, and (2) MaleX to show the efficacy of our
model. These datasets are described briefly below.
The experiments include: (1) Binary classification using
the proposed CNN model, and (2) Binary classification
of the GIST features using standard classifiers for
comparative analysis.
5.1. Datasets
We performed our experiments on the following
curated datasets.
• smalldata: This dataset consists of 16,358
Windows executable samples: 9,130 of which
are malware samples from the MalImg dataset
([53]) and the other 7,228 files are benign
(clean) samples collected from Windows system
files. We also verified the binary labels using
VirusTotal [67] service which has an aggregate of
many anti-virus products and online scan engines
to check for malware.
• MaleX: We created this large dataset where
benign and malware binaries were drawn
from various sources ([68, 69, 70]). Our final
dataset after VirusTotal [67] filtering (any
sample with VirusTotal detection ratio ≤10% is
considered as benign, and ≥90% is considered
as malware), and file-type filtering (MIME type:
“application/x-dosexec”) contains 1,044,394
Windows executable binaries with 864,669
labelled as malware and 179,725 as benign. We
believe that this dataset has reasonable number
of samples and is sufficient to test data-driven
machine learning classification methods and
also to measure the performance of the designed
models in terms of scalability and adaptability.
The only dataset comparable to MaleX is
EMBER [71], but the dataset does not have access
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to the executable binaries that is needed for our
experiments. The binaries of the MaleX dataset is
available to public upon request.
5.2. General Settings
Out of the standard classifiers, we chose k-Nearest
Neighbors (k-NN) and Random Forest as they had better
classification accuracies than other methods. These
algorithms were implemented in scikit-learn [72]. The
hyper-parameters were optimized using grid search on
smalldata. The binary classification accuracies reported
in the following sections are the 10-fold cross-validation
accuracies.
The proposed CNN models (4.1) were implemented
in Keras with TensorFlow backend. We trained different
models using 179,725 benign samples and different
subsets of 179,725 malware samples. These models
were trained with the data partitioned as follows: 70%
of images in each class were used for training, 20%
for validation, and the remaining 10% for testing.
No additional data augmentation method was used.
The binary classification accuracies on the test set
averaged for different trained models (similar to k-fold
cross-validation) are reported in the following sections.
5.3. Results
5.3.1. Binary classification on “bigram-dct” images
Table. 1 shows the classification accuracies on both
the datasets. The k-NN and Random Forest models
correspond to classification using the 320-dimensional
GIST features extracted from the “bigram-dct” images.
The CNN model corresponds to our proposed “3C2D”
network architecture (4.1.1) with single-channel
“bigram-dct” images as inputs.
Model smalldata MaleX
k-NN 0.99083 0.83817
Random Forest 0.98839 0.83308
Proposed CNN (“3C2D”) 1.00000 0.89491
Table 1: Classification accuracies on “bigram-dct”
images.
5.3.2. Binary classification on byteplot images In
our previous work, Nataraj et al. [53] proposed a
method for classifying malware represented as byteplot
images. Table. 2 shows the classification accuracies
using the same models on these byteplot images. The
byteplot images were re-sized to 256x256 to maintain
consistency among different models and experiments.
Moreover, we define a joint feature metric using
error analysis to determine how these two different
features (one from “bigram-dct” images and the other
from byteplot images) perform together in detecting
Model smalldata MaleX
k-NN 0.99511 0.83405
Random Forest 0.99022 0.82793
Proposed CNN (“3C2D”) 0.99633 0.83603
Table 2: Classification accuracies on byteplot images.
malware. More details on the metric can be found in
Appendix A. The JFS values were 0.87 and 0.81 on
smalldata and MaleX datasets, respectively.
5.3.3. Binary classification on “bigram-dct” AND
byteplot images We use both the features and define
our ensemble models as follows the k-NN and
Random Forest models correspond to classification
using the 640-dimensional GIST features obtained by
concatenating the GIST features extracted from both the
“bigram-dct” and byteplot images. Similarly, the CNN
model has the same architecture as before, but now, the
input layer has two channels (as shown in Figure 3a)
i.e., the input layer is of dimension 256x256x2. Table. 3




Random Forest 0.99267 0.84384
Proposed CNN (“3C2D”) 1.00000 0.96154
Table 3: Classification accuracies on ensemble model
(as shown in Figure 3a) including both “bigram-dct” and
byteplot images.
5.3.4. Generalizability of proposed CNN model
To validate the generalization capability of the 2-channel
CNN model, we re-trained the models using the
above-mentioned train and validation subsets (new
training set) and test subset (new validation set), and
tested on rest of the left-out MaleX dataset which has
only malicious samples. Here, we also show the ROC
(receiver operating characteristic) curves and report the
corresponding AUCs (area under the curve) to show
more details about the classifier performance, as shown
in Table. 4. Since the test set has only one class of
samples, we show ROC for the entire dataset (train +
validation + test) and compute accuracy of the test set
from the different AUCs recorded.
Subset # Malicious Samples # Benign Samples AUC
Train 161,752 161,753 0.9999252
Validation 17,973 17,972 0.9155202
Test 648,946 NA NA
Table 4: Data distribution of MaleX dataset showing
classification performance and generalization
capabilities of proposed CNN (“3C2D”) model.
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(a) Training set AUC: 0.9999252
(b) Validation set AUC: 0.9155202
Figure 4: ROC curves for shallow CNN classification
model on training and validation samples of MaleX.
ROC curve and AUC for train and validation set is
shown in Figure 4. ROC and AUC of the model tested
on all of MaleX dataset is shown in Figure 5. We use a
threshold of 0.5 to classify any sample into malicious
or benign - a value greater than 0.5 corresponds to
malicious samples and less than 0.5 as benign.
5.3.5. Transfer learning-based classification and
overall performance To observe the the effect of
neural network model depth on the classification
performance, we use pre-trained ImageNet weights,
and fine-tune ResNet models (as shown in Figure 3b)
to effectively use transfer learning-based classification
technique that is well known in literature.
Table. 5 shows the classification accuracies on
three different subsets of MaleX (as discussed in
Sec. 5.3.4) using various classifiers including the
proposed CNN and the transfer learning-based ResNet
models. Note that the accuracies are not reported for
k-NN and Random Forest models on train subset as
they are supervised data-driven algorithms that will give
Figure 5: ROC curve for shallow CNN classification
model on training, validation and test samples of MaleX
(AUC: 0.9706473).
accuracies close to (if not exactly) 100%, which will not
be useful for performance comparisons.
Model Train Validation Test
k-NN
(byteplot GIST) NA 0.7896 0.5173
Random Forest
(byteplot GIST) NA 0.7762 0.5039
k-NN
(“bigram-dct” GIST) NA 0.7905 0.5224
Random Forest
(“bigram-dct” GIST) NA 0.7880 0.5204
Proposed CNN 0.9456 0.8451 0.8360
ResNet-18 0.9566 0.8843 0.8252
ResNet-50 0.9880 0.8956 0.8620
Table 5: Classification performance on different
subsets of MaleX with different classifiers including
the proposed CNN (“3C2D”) and the transfer
learning-based ResNet models.
5.4. Discussion
As shown in Table. 1 and Table. 2, the proposed
approach using ‘bigram-dct” images and CNNs
outperforms the features obtained from byteplot
images. Please note that we also used the spatial bigram
features (results not reported) which performed poorly
in our classification experiments and that was the
motivation for using ‘bigram-dct” images in the first
place. The high joint feature metric scores mentioned
in Section 5.3.2 suggest that the features obtained from
“bigram-dct” images can be combined with the ones
from byteplot images with high confidence to give a
better representation of the malware in its entirety.
We also ensure that there is neither variance-bias
nor overfitting while training the model. We see a
Page 7137
significant improvement in the classification accuracies
on the ensemble model that uses both the “bigram-dct”
and byteplot images. This also justifies the use of our
joint feature metric to combine these features. We also
see that our proposed CNN model outperforms standard
classifier models that uses global GIST features in all
the cases.
Section 5.3.4 discusses behavior of the trained model
towards unseen larger malware subset. It is evident from
the AUC scores, that the model is learning and is able
to achieve good performance on validation set. On the
test set which has only malicious samples, our model
achieves accuracy of 83.60%. This is a “good” score
that signifies the generalization capability of the model,
given that the trained model has a shallow network
architecture and has learned from relatively less number
of samples (training set has 161,752 malicious samples
compared to that of 648,946 malicious samples in the
test set).
In Section 5.3.5, we use transfer learning-based
approach to train deeper networks and see significant
improvements in the overall classification performance,
as shown in Table. 5. This is generally the case
in computer vision literature that addresses the task
of image classification. This also signifies the fact
that the deeper networks have advantage of having
multiple layers that can learn features at various
levels of abstraction, making them much better at
generalizing to new data. The table also summarizes
all the nitty-gritty findings of the experiments and
gives a concise representation of the overall malware
detection performance using the DCT image-based
representations derived from the malware binaries.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we propose a malware detection
mechanism using byteplot images and grayscale images
from the count of bi-grams of bytes in DCT domain, and
a deep learning technique that involves Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNNs). Our results confirm that
visual textures and patterns in these images can be
used for accurate malware detection. We evaluated our
model on equi-proportionate subsets of large dataset we
created called MaleX consisting of Windows executable
samples, obtaining a mean binary classification accuracy
of 96%. We also demonstrate the generalization
capability of this model by showing the classification
performance on the bigger left-out MaleX samples.
Moreover, we demonstrated the use of deep
learning that includes transfer learning-based approach
in malware detection tasks and showed that the features
learned by the deep CNN models (ResNet) performed
significantly better than the hand-crafted GIST features
proposed in the literature, and also slightly better than
the features learned by the proposed shallow CNN
model. Finally, we also designed a metric to measure
the performance of the ensemble model which uses
combination of different features that was used to
include both the byteplot image and the “bigram-dct”
image as inputs to our designed neural network model.
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Appendices
A. Joint Feature Metric to combine
different features using Error Analysis
The need of a metric to combine various features is
important to reflect the performance of ensemble models
where there are multiple features extracted through
various techniques. We developed one such metric
which looks at the error analysis of different features.
Let’s consider a simple binary classification example
where we have 100 test samples and let feature
A mis-classify 10 of these samples, and feature B
mis-classify 20 of the test samples. An ideal case
for the features A and B to be jointly rewarding is
when the overlap between the mis-classified samples
is 0, i.e., when feature B can correctly classify the
10 samples that were mis-classified by feature A, and
feature A can correctly classify the 20 samples that
were mis-classified by feature B. We can then define
an error-analysis matrix as follows: element (i, j)
represents the number of samples classified correctly by
the feature representing jth column and mis-classified
by the feature representing ith row. In our example, the






Let us consider another case where the overlap between
the mis-classified samples is 5, i.e., feature B correctly
classifies 5 (out of 10) samples that were mis-classified
by feature A, and feature A correctly classifies 15 (out
of 20) samples that were mis-classified by feature B. In






The row-normalized (by number of mis-classified






















The “closeness” between ˆEAI and ˆEAR is defined
as the measure to quantify combining features A and
B. This “closeness” is measured by a Matrix 2-norm,
which is unique as the norm of the difference matrix
can never exceed the value 2 (this is true for any square
matrix). Therefore, this metric is well-defined as it
belongs to a range [0,2]. A value close to 0 demonstrates
the usefulness of the combination of features. A final
confidence score (value between 0 and 1) called “Joint
Feature Score (JFS)” which is the measure to quantify
the combination of features can then be defined as
follows:
JFS =















which can be interpreted in two ways: (1) Features A
and B can be combined to give better ensemble feature
representation for classification with a confidence score
of 0.75, (2) the maximum possible error reduction of
the ensemble model (using features A and B) in terms
of accuracy is 75% compared to the worse performing
feature (B) model i.e., the ensemble model will have
an estimated classification accuracy of 95% (80 +
(0.75*20)) compared to 80% obtained using the feature
B model.
This metric can also be computed for more than
two features, where the error-analysis matrix will be
a square matrix and the number of rows or columns
are greater than two. In such cases, the joint feature
measure between two or more features can be computed
by extracting the corresponding rows/columns of the
error-analysis matrix and then computing the JFS value
for those features.
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